Abstract. I'll describe a range of systems for nonmonotonic conditionals that behave like conditional probabilities above a threshold. The rules that govern each system are probabilistically sound in that each rule holds when the conditionals are interpreted as conditional probabilities above a threshold level specific to that system. The well-known preferential and rational consequence relations turn out to be special cases in which the threshold level is 1. I'll describe systems that employ weaker rules appropriate to thresholds lower than 1, and compare them to these two standard systems.
Introduction
I will describe a range of nonmonotonic conditionals that behave like conditional probabilities above a threshold. More precisely, let r be a fixed real number greater than 1/2, and let P be any conditional probability function defined on a language for predicate logic with identity. Consider the conditional |~ defined as follows: B|~A holds just in case P[A | B] ≥ r. Let's call |~, as just defined, the r-level consequence relation associated with conditional probability function P. More generally, the rlevel consequence relations are just those associated with at least one conditional probability function P at threshold level r. I will characterize r-level consequence relations for various values of r in terms of logical rules -rules like, "if (B·C)|~A and (B·¬C)|~A, then B|~A", which are only about the conditional expressions, and say nothing of probabilities. It turns out that the logical rules that these conditionals satisfy are mostly weaker versions of the logical rules for the two best-known logics of nonmonotonic conditionals -i.e., the logics of the preferential consequence relations, P, and of the rational consequence relations, which I'll call R. 1 The conditionals I'll be investigating are of the kind that nonmonotonic logicians call 'consequence relations' by analogy to the logical consequence relation. They are metalinguistic relations between sentences. Conditional probability functions applied to sentences are also usually taken to be metalinguistic -i.e. they are not generally taken to be part of the object language. So, the corresponding conditionals, |~, are also metalinguistic. Thus, I will call all of the conditionals under investigation here 'consequence relations'. This paper is aimed at two audiences. It's pitched at probabilistic logicians, who may find it of interest for the way it articulates the qualitative structure of conditionalprobability-above-a-threshold. In that regard this logic is somewhat like the logic of Qualitative Probability (a.k.a. Comparative Probability). But whereas the basic concept in that logic is the 'A is-no-more-probable-than B' relation, A B, the basic concept we'll be looking at here is the 'given B, it-is-very-probable-that A' relation B|~A. More accurately, we will investigate a whole array of such consequence relations ranging from 'it-is-more-probable-than-not-that' (corresponding to a threshold just over 1/2), through consequence relations for various higher threshold levels, up to 'it-is-almost-certain-that' (corresponding to a threshold of 1). Each quantitative probability function embodies all of these qualitative notions at once. Perhaps something can be learned from disentangling them.
The other audience I'm pitching consists of logicians interested the nonmonotonic conditionals known as consequence relations. The systems under study have a common core, a system I'll call O, whose rules are weaker analogues of the rules for the well-known system P of Preferential Consequence Relations. Various ways of supplementing the rules of O give rise to various systems of consequence relations, including the system P itself and the system for the Rational Consequence Relations, R. What ties these systems together is the way in which they are embodied by (i.e. modeled in) the conditional probability functions. Indeed, every conditional probability function embodies a complete array of nonmonotonic consequence relations drawn from the systems we'll be looking at.
Here is a brief outline of how I'll proceed. First I'll specify the logic of conditional probabilities that will serve as a standard against which we'll gauge the nonmonotonic conditional logics. Next I'll set down rules for a system of consequence relations that I call O. Each rule for consequence relations in O is r-level sound for each r > 0. That is, choose any specific threshold r > 0: then by replacing each conditional expression of form B|~A in the rules of O by a conditional probability sentence P[A | B] ≥ r, each rule turns out to hold for every probability function P. If we add an additional simple rule to O, the rule known as AND, we get the preferential consequence relations P -even though three of the rules of O are much weaker than their usual counterparts associated with P. Add to the rules of P the rule known as Rational Monotony (RM) and we get the rational consequence relations R. Interestingly, it turns out that the consequence relations of system R are just the class of threshold-level-1 probabilistic consequence relations. That is, for each relation |~ that satisfies the rules of R there is a conditional probability function P such that B|~A holds just in case P[A | B] = 1; and the probability 1 part of each conditional probability function is just a consequence relation |~ that satisfies the rules of R.
The fact that the 1-level consequence relations are so tightly connected with the well-known rational consequence relations suggests that it may be illuminating to take a look at r-level consequence relations for values of r less than 1. We will see what additional rules, added to O, are probabilistically sound for various levels of the threshold r below 1. Although neither AND nor Rational Monotony (RM), nor the rule known as Cautious Monotony (CM) are probabilistically sound for thresholds r below 1, the weaker monotonicity rule called Negation Rationality (NR) does turn out to be probabilistically sound for each possible threshold level r > 0. The system for consequence relations gotten by supplementing O with Negation Rationality constitutes the system I'll call Q.
None of the rules of Q itself are specific to a given threshold level r > 0. That is, each rule of Q applies to all r-level consequence relations, for any given value of r. However, there are two additional rules that are closely tied to specific threshold levels. One applies whenever the threshold r is greater than some rational number (n−1)/n, for fixed n 2. The other applies whenever the threshold r is no greater than the rational number n/(n+1), for fixed n 2. I call the system of consequence relations that satisfy both of these rules, for a specific value of n, Q(n). They behave like conditional probabilities above some threshold r such that (n−1)/n < r ≤ n/(n+1). These level-specific rules turn out to have a close connection to the Preface and the Lottery Paradoxes.
The Logic of Conditional Probabilities
When applied to propositions or sentences, probability is usually specified as a oneplace function, and conditional probability is then defined in terms of this function: However, there is a very natural way of axiomatizing probability that takes conditional probability as primitive. It turns out that this treatment of conditional probability is closely related to logics of nonmonotonic conditionals.
Think of conditional probabilities as extending logical entailment to a conception of probabilistic truth-transmission from premise to conclusion. There are many such extensions -many such probability functions. For, unlike deductive logical entailment, the notion of probabilistic entailment may depend on what the sentences mean. Formally, the degree to which premise B probabilistically entails conclusion A relative to an interpretation of a language L is represented by a function on pairs of sentences, P [A | B]. We may think of each conditional probability function P as associated with some way of assigning meanings to the terms of the language, and as supplementing that with a measure on possible worlds. Thus, 'P [A | B] = r' may be taken to say that among the worlds in which sentence B is true, A is true in proportion r of them (according to some measure on worlds associated with P ).
Alternatively, we may think of ' ' as representing a possible agent, and think of each possible agent as having (either implicitly or explicitly) some degree-of-belief function that expresses how strongly premise sentences support conclusion sentences. For an agent , let P represent her conditional degree-of-belief function, given the meaning of the sentences of her language.
Whatever way one conceptualizes the conditional probability functions, the axioms for these functions specify constraints that they must respect given the meanings of logical terms (not, and , or, etc.). Here is a fairly standard set of axioms: Perhaps a comment on the formal language I'm using is in order here before proceeding. All of the logical systems I'll describe in this paper are defined on a standard formal language L for predicate logic with identity. Nothing I'll say really hangs on this. The language could just as well have been weaker -say, that of sentential logic. But then the reader might have been left wondering whether the results only hold for the weaker language. The CP functions are basically just the Popper-Field functions; however the usual axiomatization for the Popper-Field functions is more elegant in that it does not employ (or in any way presuppose) the deductive notion of logical truth or logical consequence. See [2] and [3] for details. 3 It is also common to define probability on propositions instead of on sentences of a formal language, where a proposition is taken to be a set of possible worlds. In that case one would have to broach the issue of whether the probability functions are countably additive or only finitely additive. That issue doesn't arise here because the object language L doesn't have an expression for infinite disjunction (which would correspond to countable unions). It does, however, have existential quantifiers, which behave somewhat like infinite disjunctions. Indeed, one could add a weak kind of countable additivity axiom to the axioms of CP, as follows: for each open formula Fx,
, where the individual constants c 1 , ..., c n , ..., exhaust the countably infinite list of L's individual constants. However, in the context of predicate logic this axiom seems overly strong, since it effectively assumes that every individual gets named. If we don't assume that all individuals are named, the strongest claim we should want is that P[∃xFx | B] lim n P[Fc 1 ∨...∨Fc n | B]. However, this already follows from the axioms of CP, because B·(
There are two complimentary ways of describing a logic for nonmonotonic consequence relations. Sometimes logicians identify such a logic in terms of its inference rules. The issue then is, "what are reasonable rules for a nonmonotonic consequence relation to follow, and what inferences can we make from some conditional claims to others based on these rules." Other times we think of such a logic as a class of possible consequence relations, all of those that satisfy certain constraints. In this mode the "rules" just express the constraints. In standard deductive logic the former mode is most usually associated with the "syntactic" proof theory of the logic, and the later mode is associated with the semantics. But labeling these two modes as "syntactic" and "semantic" is not very helpful in the logics we will be looking at. Rather, in these logics it may be best to think of the consequence relations themselves as semantic, as part of the metalanguage, just as probability functions are semantic -i.e., they are not part of the object language. That's how presentations of the well-known nonmonotonic logics P and R often treat consequence relations (e.g. see [4] and [5] ).
To see the point, think about the logic of conditional probability -the system CP just described. The axioms of CP can be used to derive some conditional probability claims from others -a very useful thing when we have only partial information about a probability function (or about a class of such functions). On the other hand, we also associate with CP the class of all conditional probability functions -all functions on pairs of sentences that satisfy the axioms. When we think of the logic this way, the axioms play the role of constrains that must be satisfied if a function is to be considered a CP-function. Thus the "logic of CP" both tells us which functions are "in CP" in terms of rules that specify constraints on all such functions, and it gives us rules for deriving some probability statements from others, where the soundness of such derivations depend on the fact that all CP-functions are defined in terms of those very rules.
Both of these ways of looking at CP is "semantic" in the sense that the probability functions in CP are semantic functions -not part of the object language. The object language on which they are defined is generally a formal language for sentential or predicate logic. The probability functions play the role of metalinguistic, semantic predicates, in much the way that truth-under-interpretation is metalinguistic and semantic. So the "derivation rules" are really semantic rules that specify precisely what semantic claims (involving probabilities) can be derived from others -much as the semantic rules governing truth-value assignments can be used to derive claims about what truth-values of sentences follow from the truth-values of other sentences.
Each of the systems for nonmonotonic consequence relations I'll discuss has this same dual aspect. For example, I am about to specify "the logic" of the system I'll call O. (Think of O, represented by the letter 'O', as system-zero, the weakest system I'll talk about.) I will specify O in terms of certain semantic rules that any consequence relation must satisfy to be an O-relation.
Consider the set of all ordered pairs of sentences from a given language. Take any subset of it -let's call it ' '. Any such is a rudimentary consequence relation. We usually write these ordered pairs like this: 'B|~A', rather than like this: '<B,A>'. So when the pair <B,A> is in , we say instead that the conditional expression 'B|~A' is in . (One might here employ the subscripting convention we used with probability functions: just as there are various possible probability functions P , there are various possible consequence relations |~ .)
Many such consequence relations will be of no interest at all. They violate even the most obvious constraints on how a consequence relation should behave. The system O specifies some very weak semantic rules that we'll suppose any set of pairs of sentences should satisfy if it is to reasonably count as a consequence relation. The consequence relations in O are just those that satisfy the following semantic constraints. Some of the rules of O should be familiar. The non-triviality condition is not usually given. Clearly it is only violated by that one monstrous consequence relation that holds between all pairs of sentence. Reflexivity, Right Weakening, and Left Logical Equivalence are plausible conditions, satisfied by all well-known families of consequence relations. The three remaining rules are weakened versions of wellknown rules for nonmonotonic consequence relations. We'll look at them in more detail in a moment.
Notice that each of the rules 0-6 is probabilistically sound at level r, for any level r you might choose. That is, fix a threshold value r. Now replace each expression of form X|~Y in these rules with the corresponding expression P[Y | X] r. Then each such rule is a theorem of probability theory -i.e., each follows from the rules of CP. This is obvious for rules 0- However O is not probabilistically complete There are consequence relations satisfying all of these rules that cannot be represented by any conditional probability function and threshold. This follows from the fact that there are additional probabilistically sound rules not derivable from the rules of O. We will see some of these additional rules presently.
How do the rules of O compare with those of the well-known preferential consequence relations, characterized by the set of rules P? P has rules 1-3 (REFLEX, RW, and LLE). But P contains stronger versions of each of the rule 4-6. Here is a typical definition of P: Definition 3: P. Let L be a language for predicate logic with identity. Let '|=' be the standard logical entailment relation. A P Consequence Relation on L is any set of pairs of sentences that satisfies the following rules: 0. There are sentences D and E such that it isn't the case that E|~D (Non-Triviality) Rule 5P (CM), is also probabilistically sound only when the threshold level r = 1.
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Clearly rule 5 (VCM) can be derived from CM (and the other O rules). But since CM is sound only for r = 1, it cannot be derive from VCM together with the other O rules.
The way in which CM is a strengthening of VCM is obvious. AND, which is the P counterpart of O rule 6 (WAND) is also probabilistically sound only when the threshold level r = 1. 10 Furthermore, WAND can be derived from AND plus the other O rules; but since AND is sound only for r = 1, it cannot be derive from WAND plus the other O rules.
The relationship between WAND and AND may not seem quite obvious. To see it more clearly, notice that the condition '(C·¬B)|~B' in the antecedent of WAND is a strengthening of the condition 'C|~B' in AND. 11 It expresses the idea that "C makes B certain" -i.e., C supports B so strongly that adding any other sentence D to C cannot undermine its support for B. (We'll establish this in a moment.) AND Thus, when '(C·¬B)|~B' holds, '(C·¬B)' acts like a contradiction -i.e., '(C·¬B)' implies everything, and 'C' itself monotonically implies 'B'.
Thus, O is weaker than P precisely in that its versions of rules 4-6 (WOR, VCM, WAND) are weaker versions of the corresponding P rules (OR, CM, AND), versions that are satisfied at each threshold r > 0 by every conditional probability function.
One might wonder whether we need to strengthen each of the weaker O rules in order to get the system P? The answer turns out to be, no! It's not hard to show that 4P (OR) and 5P (VCM) are derivable from the weaker rules (1-5) together 6P (AND). Thus, the Preferential Consequence Relations are just those consequence relations in O that also satisfy AND. 
Systems Q and R
The well-known Rational Consequence Relations are usually obtained by adding the following rule to those in P:
Definition 4: R. An R Consequence Relation on L is any P consequence relation that satisfies the following rule: 7R. if C|~A, then C|~ ¬B or (C·B)|~A (RM: Rational Monotony).
Like 4P-6P (OR, CM, AND), rule RM is probabilistically sound only for threshold level r = 1.
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The Rational Consequence Relations, R, are usually obtained by adding RM to the P rules. But in light of the previous result the usual rules of R are equivalent to the weaker rules 1-5 for O together with 6P (AND) and 7R (RM). In other words, the Rational Consequence Relations are just those consequence relations in O that satisfy AND together with RM. It turns out that the rules in O ∪ (AND, RM) are not only probabilistically sound at threshold level 1. They are also probabilistically complete at level 1. That is, for each Rational Consequence Relation |~ in R, there is a corresponding conditional probability function P in CP such that 'B|~A' holds just in case P[A | B] = 1. In effect, the Rational Consequence Relations are just the probability 1 parts of Conditional Probability Functions. Or, to put it another way, given any Rational Consequence Relation |~, it can always be extended to a conditional probability function P by assigning P proof: Soundness is easy. Completeness takes hard work (see [1] , [3] , and [8] ). It is easy to check that NR is probabilistically sound for each threshold level. 13 Thus, all of the Q rules are probabilistically sound at every threshold level. NR (rule 7) is clearly a weaker analog of RM (rule7R), and is derivable in R. Indeed, NR may be derived using only rule RM together with VCM (rule 5 of O) together with the following rule (which is derivable in P):
8. if B|~A and B|~¬A, then B|~D for every sentence D (XM: excluded middle). 14 Notice that XM is itself probabilistically sound for each threshold level greater than 1/2.
15 This rule is implied by one of a spectrum of rules that correspond to lower bounds on threshold levels. We'll now investigate systems that build on Q by drawing on such threshold-specific rules.
The Q(n) Systems
The rules of Q place no constraints on the value of the threshold level r > 0 required for conditional probability functions to satisfy them. That is, choose any probability function P from CP and any threshold level r you want. You may even choose r to be much smaller than 1/2 -even extremely close to 0. The consequence relation corresponding to P[ | ] r will, nevertheless, satisfy all of the Q rules. We now supplement Q with rules that characterize various levels of probabilistic support above 1/2. For each integer n 2 we specify a distinct "n-level logic", defined in terms of two rules that are jointly probabilistically sound for all and only threshold levels r in the range (n−1)/n < r n/(n+1), for n 2. Notice that PL(n) doesn't presuppose that the A i are distinct sentences. Thus, the rule PL(n) implies each of the rules PL(m) for m n. Also notice that the P rule AND implies every PL(n) rule, for every value of n 2.
Rule PL(n) says that if a collection of sentences is small enough ( n) and B nonmonotonically implies each of them, but B also implies-with-certainty that they cannot all hold, then B behaves like a "contradiction" in the sense that it implies every sentence. However, it is perfectly compatible with this rule that a "non-contradictory" sentence B may imply each of a large collection of jointly incompatible sentences, provided that collection consists of more than n distinct sentences.
In the case where n = 2, for instance, PL (2) requires that if B|~A and B|~¬A, then (since B·(A·¬A)|~ ¬(A·¬A)) it follows that B|~D for every sentence D. More generally, rule PL(2) says that whenever B·(A 1 ·A 2 )|~ ¬(A 1 ·A 2 ), we cannot have both B|~A 1 and B|~A 2 unless B behaves like a contradiction (i.e. unless B|~D for all D). Furthermore, each rule PL(n) for n > 2 implies this PL(2) rule.
Think of PL(n) this way. Consider the situation of the preface paradox (first raised by Makinson in [6] ). The author's careful editing of his book strongly supports his belief that page i is error free, for each page i, but his knowledge of his own fallibility strongly implies that at least one error has slipped by in the editing process. Let each of the first n−1 sentences A i be a sentence F i that says that page i of the book is Free from error, and let sentence A n be the sentence '¬(F 1 ·...·F n−1 )', which says that not all n−1 pages of the book are error free -that at least one page contains an error. Notice that in this case the sentence (A 1 ·...·A n ) is the sentence '(F 1 ·...·F n−1 ·¬(F 1 ·...·F n−1 ))', which is an outright logical contradiction. So, given the author's knowledge B about the book, B·(F 1 ·...·F n−1 ·¬(F 1 ·...·F n−1 ))|~ ¬(F 1 ·...·F n−1 ·¬(F 1 ·...·F n−1 )) simply follows from REFLEX and RW. Thus, the rule says that when the number of pages is n−1 (or fewer), B cannot consistently imply each of the n−1 claims that page i is error free and at the same time imply the claim that at least one of the pages contains an error. That is, rule PL(n) says that when the number of pages is too small (n−1 or smaller), B may imply each of these claims separately, and also imply that at least one of them is false, only if B itself is effectively a contradiction (in that B implies every claim, even it's own negation).
The "preface interpretation" of the A i described here is merely an illustration of the rule. The same rule holds regardless of what the sentences A i say. Notice too that this same rule, PL(n), also applies to a preface case for an n page book (and not merely to an n−1 page book, as in the above example) provided that that B implieswith-certainty that at least one page has an error -i.e. provided that B·(F 1 ·...·F n )|~ ¬(F 1 ·...·F n ).
It turns out that PL(n) is probabilistically sound for all and only the threshold levels r > (n−1)/n, as the next theorem shows. One additional observation is in order. Rule 6P is in effect the least upper bound of the PL(n) rules as n goes to infinity. This makes good sense in terms of the probabilistic models of these rules. A PL(n) rule corresponds to lower bound (n−1)/n on the threshold in conditional-probabilistic models of consequence relations. As n increases, r is driven ever closer to 1, which is precisely the probabilistic threshold appropriate to AND. For each n 2, the LL(n+1) rule applies to any n+1 distinct sentences A i that are implied-with-certainty by B to be mutually exclusive. Notice that LL(n+1) implies each LL(m) rules for m n+1. So as n decreases the LL(n+1) rules become stronger.
Think of LL(n+1) this way. Consider a lottery (described by B) in which no two tickets can win. Let each of the n+1 sentences A i say that ticket i will win, and suppose that B implies-with-certainty that no two ticket can win -i.e. that this lottery can have at most one winner. The expressions of form 'B·(A i ·A j )|~ ¬(A i ·A j )' express this. Then, according to LL(n+1), for any given block of n+1 such tickets, B must nonmonotonically imply, for at least one ticket i, the claim that ticket i will not win. (Indeed, if B treats all n+1 tickets in the same way, then it must imply that each will not win -though the requirement that all tickets are treated equally is not a part of rule LL(n+1) itself.) The idea behind LL(n+1) is that if the number of tickets is too large (n+1 or bigger), and if B makes it certain that at most one can win, then at least one of the tickets must have such little chance of winning that B defeasibly implies that it won't win. 16 There is no assumption here that the lottery is fair -that all tickets have the same chance of winning. So the logic only forces the issue for one of the n+1 tickets. Also notice that if there are more than (n+1) tickets, then for each block of (n+1) tickets, the rule applies. In other words, only for n or fewer tickets may B allow that each of them "might win" -i.e. only for n or fewer tickets may the conditional 'B|~ ¬A i ' fail to hold for each of them.
The "lottery interpretation" of the A i here is, of course, merely an illustration of the rule. The same rule holds for all consequence relations in Q(n), regardless of how the A i are interpreted.
It turns out that rule LL(n+1) is probabilistically sound for all and only the threshold levels r n/(n+1), as the next theorem shows.
Theorem 6: Probabilistic Soundness of Rule LL(n+1) for all and only the Threshold Values r n/(n+1).
For n 2, for each r > 0 such that r n/(n+1), and for each CP function P, the level-r consequence relation |~ corresponding to P (i.e. defined as 'B|~A' holds just in case P[A | B] r) satisfies LL(n+1). Furthermore, for each r > n/(n+1), there is a CP function P such that the level-r consequence relation |~ corresponding to P violates LL(n+1).
proof: To see that whenever 0 < r n/(n+1), rule LL(n+1) is satisfied by every probability function applied to threshold r: Suppose 0 < r n/(n+1) and for each pair of the n+1 sentences Rule LL(n+1) is clearly compatible with rule PL(n), since the probability above r part of every conditional probability function satisfies both rules whenever (n−1)/n < r n/(n+1). Thus, Theorems 5 and 6 show that the rules for Q(n) are probabilistically sound for precisely those thresholds r greater than (n−1)/n but no greater than n/(n+1).
The logic of the Rational Consequence Relations, R, may reasonably be called Q( ). For one thing, as n grows ever larger, the bounds r such that (n−1)/n < r n/(n+1) for probabilistic models of the Q(n) logics approach 1. For another thing, the rules PL(n) are implied by AND, and are superseded by it when r = 1. Furthermore, as n increases, rules LL(n+1) approaches vacuity. At the same time, at r = 1 rule NR (Negation Rationality) becomes too weak, and rule RM (Rational Monotony) supersedes it. Finally, at r = 1 the rules of R are probabilistically sound and complete -i.e., the probability 1 part of each conditional probability function constitutes a consequence relation in R, and each consequence relation in R is the probability 1 part of some conditional probability function.
Concluding Remarks
We've seen that the rules for Q(n) are probabilistically sound for precisely those thresholds r above (n−1)/n and no greater than n/(n+1). For any threshold level in this interval, the part of each conditional probability function above that level constitutes a consequence relation in Q(n). And for each threshold level outside of this interval, there is a conditional probability function whose part above that threshold constitutes a consequence relation not in Q(n). However, the rules of Q(n) have not been shown to be probabilistically complete. Indeed, in a private communication David Makinson has shown me that there are (linear ranked) consequence relations satisfying Q(n)'s rules that are not probabilistically modelable at any threshold level. So although in the extreme case Q( ), i.e. R, we do have probabilistic completeness, additional rules are needed to restrict the class of Q(n) consequence relations for 2 n < to the probabilistically modelable ones. What are these additional rules like?
Those of you who are familiar with the logic of qualitative probability (a.k.a. comparative probability) know that one way to get probabilistically modelable qualitative probabilities is to introduce a rule that says, in effect, that each qualitative probability relation is extendable to a relation on language that includes sentences that form arbitrarily fine partitions, where all sentences of a given partition are "approximately qualitatively equal". It may then be shown that these equal partition sentences can be used as a standard of comparison to fix numerical probabilistic weights on all sentences of the language, and thereby generate a numerical probability function. A rather similar idea may be applicable to the consequence relations in Q(n). I investigated one way to make this idea work in an earlier article (see [2] , sections 4.2 and 4.3). But the presuppositions of that approach seem overly strong. So, the issue of how to plausibly supplement Q(n) in a way that completely
